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For the majority of humans, religious belief is a central organising
factor in one’s life. The freedom or right to manifest that belief is
therefore of utmost importance. Indeed it has been considered so
important that the United Nations (UN) wrote the right to freedom of
religion and belief into its Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948.1 However this freedom is far from being universally enjoyed.
The focus of this paper, the Central Asian state of Turkmenistan, is a
case in point. The regime of Turkmenistan has been described as one
of the world’s most oppressive and totalitarian. With a human rights
climate described in terms of ‘a fundamental absence’ of religious
freedom, and the actions of President Niyazov towards religions not
approved by the state, the open practice of religion has become
dangerous to safety and to liberty.2 This paper describes recent events
in which the government of Turkmenistan has interfered with its
peoples’ right to freedom of belief. The ideological gap left by the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent struggle for control
and national identity has led to many serious breaches of this right. It
is argued that these actions are clearly a part of an attempt by
President Niyazov to construct a ‘Turkmen’ nation from the Soviet
ashes, which has included a personality cult of great vanity. These
events will be shown to be a clear instance of discrimination against
religious groups, founded in the fear of losing control of the
government and of the ‘identity’ of the nation. The ramifications of
such discrimination in the light of the ‘War on Terror’ provide an
insight to the political workings of global diplomacy.
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The rejection of difference is a key motivating factor in religious
discrimination, as are notions of superiority or exclusivity of religious
truth. When the state is responsible for such discrimination, the
situation becomes much more complex, especially for the scholar
attempting to find the reasons behind it. Religiously, Turkmenistan is
predominantly Sunni Islamic (88.5%), the remainder of the
population being mostly Russian Orthodox Christians (11.4%).3
Historically, the Sunni population has shown little inclination to
follow the fundamentalist strains exhibited in other countries and
most follow their own brand of vernacular Islam. Nissman claims that
‘Islam manifests itself in almost every aspect of Turkmen life’.4 In
Turkmenistan, he maintains, Islam remains closely linked with tribal
and clan institutions. Most ethnic Turkmen identify themselves as a
member of one of the five major tribes: the Tekes of Mary, the Tekes
of Attok, the Ersaris, the Yomuds and the Goklans, all of whom
speak dialects of the same Orguz Turkic language. Ethnic Turkmen
are estimated to compose 73.5% of the population and are the most
traditional, in terms of division along tribal lines, of the Central Asian
peoples.5
At the time of independence, Turkmenistan had the highest rate of
unemployment, highest infant mortality rate, lowest literacy level,
and the most polluted agricultural land in the Soviet Union.6 Sadly,
little progress has been made in moving from the authoritarian style
of government of the Soviet to a more democratic one and
Turkmenistan remains, alone amongst the post-Soviet bloc countries,
a one-party state.7 Article 1 of Turkmenistan’s constitution (of 18
May 1992) states that Turkmenistan is a ‘presidential republic’. It has
a president, a prime minister and a parliament called the ‘Supreme
                                                           
3 S K Batalden and S L Batalden, The Newly Independent States of Eurasia (Phoenix,
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4 D Nissman, ‘Turkmenistan: Just Like Old Times’ in I Bremmer and R Taras (eds)
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Soviet’. The government also includes the Khalk Maslakhaty
(Peoples’ Council) for passage of constitutional amendments.
However the party system and constitutional process are at best
nominal, as in reality all power has lain in the hands of President
Niyazov. Other parties trying to register have been banned on the
basis that they have the potential to promote ethnic, religious or
political tensions within society. The Turkmenistan Democratic Party
(TDP – the renamed Turkmenistan Communist Party (TCP)) has
pledged reforms in economics, politics and culture to democratise
Turkmenistan’s society, and to cultivate and develop Turkmen
history and traditions. It has promised to act without regard for
nationality or personal beliefs, and to promote equality. Turkmenistan
has been recognised by most countries and is a member of the UN
and the Islamic Cooperation Organisation. Turkmenistan is also a
signatory of the Helsinki Convention – a hypocritical position
considering the disregard for many of the freedoms set out in the act.
Indeed, Turkmenistan has been referred to as a ‘worst-case scenario
of post-Soviet development’.8
Religious Freedom and Religious Discrimination in
Turkmenistan
During the Soviet era, all religion in Turkmenistan was either
controlled or suppressed. The present situation had its beginnings in
February 1990, when Turkmenistan’s First Deputy Procurator
(similar to the role of vice president in the oblast administrative
division) announced that measures would be taken against
‘unregistered movements’. The party line was that those
organisations not contributing to ‘perfecting socialism’ would meet
opposition. A statement by the former head of the Islam Democratic
Party, Abdureshid Saidov, to the effect that Islam was incompatible
with Marxism-Leninism, understandably left the predominantly
                                                           
8 S Badertinov, ‘Turkmenistan Country Report’ in A Karatnycky, A Motyl and A
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Marxist-Leninist staffed government in a difficult position in a
society in which Islam is the dominant religion.9
President Niyazov was elected to office by the TCP on 27 October
1990 and retained his position throughout the process of
independence. Since that date, numerous and regular human rights
violations have occurred. Critics of the party or the president are
suppressed and censorship utilised to support government ideology.
Religious minorities, especially those that do not fit the president’s
ideal of Turkmen culture, are also suppressed. Vitaly Ponomarev of
the Moscow-based Central Asia Human Rights Information Centre
states that ‘Turkmen authorities have increasingly used falsified
criminal charges to combat minority religious groups’.10 Baptists,
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Pentecostal Christians, other Protestant
denominations, and Bahá’ís have been particularly targeted, usually
on the spurious grounds of holding unregistered religious gatherings.
A 2001 US State Department report on religious freedom in
Turkmenistan claims that the governmental harassment of
unregistered religious groups has intensified in recent times. However
the report makes the important point that this harassment is not
present at a societal level.11 Socially the vast majority of interactions
between religious traditions appear to have been peaceful, tolerant
and inclusive.
Turkmenistan’s constitution provides for freedom of religion, as does
the 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organisations, which was amended in 1995 and 1997. In practice,
however, the law has been interpreted to control religious life tightly
and to severely restrict the activities of all religions. Article 6 of
Turkmenistan’s Constitution states that people are free to practice
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religion;12 Article 11 states: ‘Everyone has the right independently to
determine her or his own religious preference, to practice any religion
alone or in association with others, to practice no religion, to express
and disseminate beliefs related to religious preference, and to
participate in the performance of religious cults, rituals, and
ceremonies’.13 The government’s legal justification for discrimination
against religious groups comes from Article 3. This ensures freedom
of conscience and states that the freedom to profess a religion is
subject only to restrictions necessary to safeguard ‘public safety and
order, life and health of the people, and morale’.14 The vagueness in
the wording provides the government enormous latitude in
interpreting the concepts of ‘public safety, order, and morale’. As a
result, the government seeks to maintain a close relationship with
religious representatives and institutions.
It does so by exercising control over all religious activities. All
religious organisations must register with the government, although
only two religious organisations have had an easy time doing so: the
Russian Orthodox Church and the state-approved Spiritual
Directorate of Muslims. In order to attain registration, an organisation
must have at least five hundred adult citizens in each locality in
which it wishes to operate. This makes the position of minority
religious traditions almost impossible, as they may not have five
hundred members nationwide, and effectively prevents all but the
state-approved Islam and Orthodox Christianity from registering.
There are for example only an estimated one thousand Jews in
Turkmenistan. The situation is further exacerbated by government
officials’ harassment of those who do publicly sign documents
pertaining to their religious beliefs. Non-registered religious groups
are prohibited from conducting religious activities, including
gathering, disseminating religious materials and proselytising. The
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Baptists actually meet the numerical criteria for registration in some
regions, yet were long denied recognition.15 When citizens openly
proclaim their attempt to register, authorities regularly harass
signatories in order to make them withdraw their support.16
Members of religious groups not approved by the state have faced
harassment, imprisonment, loss of employment and confiscation of
property. These measures have typically been carried out by the
National Security Council (KNB, formerly KGB), which appears to
have long been under the direct control of the president. In February
2000, authorities arrested Muslim religious leader Khoja Ahmed
Orazgylych for criticising the government and the president in a
Radio Liberty broadcast. Subsequently they demolished the mosque
he operated and burnt copies of his translation of the Qur’an that the
government itself had commissioned and approved.17 In June 2001, a
family of Jehovah’s Witnesses was evicted from their home for
conducting Bible study meetings there.18 Members of Jehovah’s
Witnesses who had been imprisoned for conscientious objection were
not released at the end of their term because they refused to swear an
oath of loyalty to the president.19 The International Society for
Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) has also been the target of
harassment and in 2001 the government demolished their temple in
Mary. The Keston News Service reported in February 2001 that local
authorities of the Niyazov district of Ashgabat (named after the
president) had sealed the country’s last functioning Baptist church. In
March 2001, the authorities reportedly broke the seals and removed
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the church’s contents. The church had been in existence for 20 years,
was corporately owned by the congregation and had been registered
under the Soviet Union, but had lost registration in 1997 under the
new law.20 A further, unregistered Baptist congregation was also
evicted in March 2001, this time from the private house in which it
had held religious services for over twenty years.21 Finally, in early
May 2002, Protestants in a Turkmen village were ordered to swear an
oath on a copy of President Niyazov’s ‘spiritual book’, the
R u k h n a m a , renouncing the Bible and their faith in Jesus.22
Interestingly, the one minority religion that has so far been able to
practice quasi-legally and without harassment has been the Catholic
Church. Its three priests enjoy diplomatic immunity.23
These are just some of many continuing examples of restrictions and
violations of religious freedom the people of Turkmenistan have
faced in recent years. Those particularly active in unauthorised
religious groups are regularly detained on fabricated charges, and
university students have been threatened with expulsion if they
continue ‘illegal’ religious activities. The Gengeshi (Council for
Religious Affairs), Justice Ministry, the police and local authorities,
in addition to the KNB, have all been involved in these acts. These
institutions are understood to have been under the direct command of
President Niyazov. It must be noted, however, that keeping an up-to-
date account of the state of religious freedom in Turkmenistan is
difficult, as no locally based human rights groups are allowed to
operate in the country.
The government also restricts and controls access to religious
education. Critical of religious schools in the past, President Niyazov
ordered all remaining madrasas (Islamic schools) in the country
closed in 2001. This measure relates to the government’s position on
parents who raise their children according to their religious beliefs,
                                                           
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 F Corley, ‘Turkmenistan: Protestants Forced to Renounce their Faith’, Keston
News Service, 17 May 2002.
23 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Religious Intolerance, 29.
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which it sees as detracting from a nationalist upbringing. An
Adventist pastor was detained in Turkmenabad in October 2000
because the children of congregation members were present at the
prayer service.24 Further restrictions have been placed on ‘non-
traditional’ religious traditions by the ruling that foreign missionary
work is prohibited. Ethnic Turkmen found to be disseminating the
religious material of unregistered religious groups have been found to
receive harsher physical and legal treatment than non-ethnic
Turkmen,25 further highlighting the president’s peculiar aim
(unsettlingly reminiscent of Nazi policies) to create a national
Turkmen identity
In 1997 the government passed a new version of the Law on Freedom
of Conscience and Religious Organisations, which effectively banned
all religious movements apart from the two state sanctioned religions
– over which the government exerts a great deal of control in the
selection of religious clergy.26 Many religious groups that had been
registered for some time, including Baptists and Bahá’ís, were
suddenly ‘deregistered’ and prevented from reregistering due to the
onerous registration requirements. This law appears to be an attempt
to rid Turkmenistan of religious groups deemed ‘non-traditional’ by
the president.
The legal position of religious movements is made more tenuous by
corruption in the legal system in Turkmenistan. The president
appoints most judges and oversees the functioning of the courts in the
interests of the regime. Public prosecutors are given broad powers,
whilst defendants are often denied due process rights, such as the
right to a public hearing, the right to access evidence, the right to call
witnesses to testify on their behalf and the right to legal council and
representation. Compounding this, most of the available lawyers are
employed by the state. In addition, many defendants are coerced into
                                                           
24 US Department of State, 2001 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom.
25 Ibid.
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confession.27 As a result the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has for a number of
consecutive years recommended that Turkmenistan be designated a
‘Country of Particular Concern’ for ‘egregious, ongoing, and
systematic violations of religious freedom’.28 The motivation of the
government is best expressed by former Commissioner Firuz
Kazemzadeh of the USCIRF: ‘The government lives in fear. It is
frightened of events that have overtaken Afghanistan’.29 Thankfully
some of this pressure has recently been eased. In 2004 President
Niyazov issued decrees decriminalising unregistered religious activity
and easing some requirements for registration.30 Nevertheless, the
government continues to see religious organisations as a potential
threat to its own power and stability.
The Cult Of The President And The Creation Of The Turkmen
Nation
In its quest to construct a Turkmen nation, the government has
emphasised stability and gradual reform, whilst focusing on
nationalism and the glorification of president Niyazov. The 1993
OSCE report on Turkmenistan claims that, despite the repressive
policies, the government may well have ‘bought’ this stability: the
country’s relatively small population and large natural resources
mean that the government may effectively mollify the population
economically.31 Rashid argues that this policy has been superficial at
best, however, as loyalties lie first with the extended family, then the
clan and then the tribe. The state still usually figures last in the minds
of most Turkmen.32 The US State Department sees the current
situation as a holdover from the Soviet era. The government believes
                                                           
27 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Judicial Systems and Human
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28 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2002 Annual
Report, 13.
29 Kazemzadeh, op cit.
30 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2006 Annual
Report, 167.
31 See Nissman, op cit, 642.
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that liberal religious policies may lead to political dissent. This may
be the case with extremist movements prevalent in neighbouring
states, but the government also views participation in moderate, non-
traditional religions as a threat to the state’s stability and neutrality.33
In spite of the oppressive measures and restrictions on personal
freedoms outlined above, however, Turkmenistan has proven to be
the most politically stable of the new Central Asian states.
President Niyazov placed great emphasis on developing a strong
national identity to aid stability, maintaining a cultural identity by
stopping outside influence, and strengthening Turkmenistan’s
position internationally. A part of the present problem has been his
perception of the ideological competition present through Central
Asia for the past two centuries between Islam, tribalism, nationalism
and socialism.34 In Turkmenistan, political unity as such is relatively
recent, developing mainly in the twentieth century. Under Russian
rule, language and religion (Islam) were the two main factors that
transcended tribal division and the putative national concept, and
helped to maintain some form of cultural belonging. A third, more
elusive factor can be called ‘Turkmenism’, what it means to be a
Turkmen as opposed to anything else.35 In addition to this, the
strengthening of Turkmen language in schools has been identified as
an important step towards developing a new national identity. After
independence, Niyazov encouraged a nationalist ideology as part of a
nascent personality cult. Indeed, the situation in Turkmenistan
became so bizarre that it has been compared to that of North Korea,
with its system of lifetime leadership and the personality cults
surrounding its leaders.36
Underlying and permeating the factors that influence the control of
religion and belief is the lasting effect of more than one hundred
years of Soviet control. Motyl argues that the current political
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situation is a legacy of the country’s history under communist rule.
The level to which a country was politically, economically and
socially dominated during the communist era, he argues, determines
the extent to which institutions such as those instantiated in a
democracy, free market and civil society can exist. Turkmenistan
(perhaps the most dominated, certainly one of the least
technologically advanced, and the least developed in terms of
infrastructure and autonomous government) faced the almost
impossible task of constructing a democracy, an economy and a
social morale from what was effectively chaos. It is therefore
unsurprising, Motyl asserts, that a totalitarian regime emerged from
the desperate struggle for control.37 Rashid makes the interesting
point that in the 1917 revolution, most people were eager for
independence and were denied it, whereas in the 1991 revolution,
many people did not want the independence that was thrust upon
them.38 However, this does not seem to take into account the 1991
referendum mentioned above, that overwhelmingly supported
independence.
Prior to the Russian conquest, the dominant forces in Turkmen life
were the tribe, clan, family and the Islamic religion; these remain
strong forces today. The Soviet policy was directed at dismantling
tribal and religious systems and institutions of power, and especially
the Islamic clergy, who were considered anti-Bolshevik.39 Rashid
argues that the Russians viewed the Central Asian peoples as
primitive barbarians, in memory of the centuries lived under the
Mongols and the Tartars.40 To what extent this group memory
features in modern Turkmen politics, he leaves unclear. It is
reasonable to assume, however, that the feeling was mutual and that
the Turkmen memory of Russian rule is equally bitter. Following
independence Turkmenistan faced a massive economic crisis. Food
shortages, huge inflation and a sudden need to privatise industry and
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find buyers for its massive, and now expensive, gas reserves resulted
in chaos for the new democratic government. Turkmenistan was
initially the most ill-prepared of the Central Asian republics to deal
with the problems of independence.41 The end of the Soviet
communist era left an ideological and psychological gap that the
government is still trying to fill. We thus see the promotion of an
artificial nationalism and the bizarre cult of the leader, where the
president is portrayed as an almost superhuman being – even a
prophet. The tactics employed by the government in the service of
this ideology are reminiscent of Stalinist and Soviet-era repression.
Niyazov sought to keep Turkmenistan isolated and free from political
turmoil, continuing the discourse of nationhood implanted by Soviet
rule.42 To this end, he has created a Stalinist personality cult around
himself. He named himself Turkmenbashi, ‘the father of the Turkmen
nation’, and in December 1999 the Khalk Maslakhaty (the supreme
legislative body) amended the constitution to make him president for
life.43 Ironically, the cult of personality surrounding Niyazov can be
seen as quasi-religious: it even included a gold-plated statue that
rotates 360 degrees every twenty-four hours so as always to face the
sun. The break-up of the Soviet Union gave rise to a significant
growth in religious life in Central Asia in both traditional and non-
traditional religions. The number of mosques in Turkmenistan has
more than tripled since 1990, for example.44 Seeing this rise, and
noting the increasing influence of foreign systems of belief, Niyazov
wrote the Rukhnama, a spiritual guidebook on Turkmen culture and
heritage, released in February 2001. In the years since its release, the
personality cult has been elevated to a new level, the president
becoming not only the political ruler but also the spiritual leader of
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the nation. Rukhnama is a Perso-Arabic word literally meaning ‘soul
book’.45 It is portrayed by the state-controlled media as a repository
of truth about morality and a guide for the conduct of life for the
Turkmen people; it is described using an Islamic idiom that suggests
it is revelation that has ‘descended to earth’.46 Following the release
of the Rukhnama, many of Niyazov’s admirers have likened him to a
prophet. Indeed, his spokesperson once said he believed Niyazov was
a prophet. Niyazov believed the Rukhnama should rank in importance
next to the Bible and the Qur’an. The four hundred page book of
moral and ethical commandments was adopted by the Khalk
Maslakhaty and earned the president the ‘Hero of Turkmenistan’
award for ‘outstanding service’ to the Turkmen people. Incidentally,
this was the fourth time he had received the award. He was, to that
date, its only recipient.47
One of the most disturbing aspects of such violations of human rights
was their long-term ramifications. Political repression and refusal to
open the economy to attract foreign investment make Turkmenistan
one of the most potentially unstable states in Central Asia. The
constitution carries many guarantees that do not exist in practice, and
many rights and freedoms enshrined in it are open to legislative
manipulation due to ambiguous wording.48 The most important issue,
however, is the interaction between religion and politics. As Boyle
and Sheen note poignantly, ‘The interweaving of the religious and the
political, whether explicit or concealed, continues to underlie
attitudes and behaviour, and to fuel and entrench conflicts’.49
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA have motivated
many countries to take ‘anti-terrorist’ steps with the aim of protecting
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citizens and institutions. In countries such as Turkmenistan, however,
this has come at the further expense of basic human rights. Indeed,
the UN itself may unintentionally be legitimising the actions of the
Turkmen government. Resolution 1373, adopted by the UN Security
Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which is
binding for all member states, is directed at the combating of
‘terrorist acts’. This calls on states to withdraw any support from
‘terrorist’ organisations and to ensure that the perpetrators of such
acts and those assisting them be brought to justice. There has been
some concern that the terms ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorist acts’ were
vaguely defined and open to differing interpretations. In the case of
Turkmenistan, this may have facilitated and legitimised the
government’s violations of human rights and provided further
grounds for action against groups it perceives to be threatening.50 At
this stage, no action has been taken that directly results from the
adoption of the resolution. Turkmenistan needs to retain good foreign
relations, especially with its neighbours, as almost all of its export
revenue comes from oil, gas and cotton.51
The increasing violations of human rights in countries such as
Turkmenistan must be considered for their potential to contribute to
terrorism. Violations of human rights erode confidence in the
government, contribute to radicalisation of minority political and
religious groups, legitimate the ideologies of militant insurgents and,
indeed, constitute a form of state terrorism themselves. With the
pretext of the threat of terrorism or, in the case of Turkmenistan, the
threat to national stability, repression has in all likelihood contributed
to the very situation it seeks to redress. As the OSCE stressed in its
2001 report on terrorism: ‘A campaign against terrorism will only be
successful when it is also a campaign for human rights’.52 The same
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report goes on to state that Turkmenistan’s human rights record has
been the worst in the OSCE region.53 At a 2002 OSCE regional
conference on freedom of belief and expression, it was stressed that
‘denial of individuals’ basic right to worship and to follow a religion
of their choice …. can destabilise a society’.54 Disturbingly, the
majority of governments’ dealings with Turkmenistan seem to be
more focused on the short-term tactical goals of maintaining an ally
rather than addressing its flagrant human rights abuses. Since the late
1990s, the USCIRF, the advising agency on religious freedom to the
US Department of State, has consistently designated Turkmenistan as
a ‘Country of Particular Concern’. The State Department has
consistently failed to do so in its annual reports, however, for reasons
that remain unclear.
Niyazov appears to have been out of touch with the terrorised and
impoverished population. A recent edict, requiring school-teachers to
publish praise of the president in order to qualify for higher pay
levels, only serves as further evidence of his megalomania.55 Much of
the money in the state budget has been spent on monuments
sustaining his personality cult, rather than improvements for the
country’s general economic situation.56 Politically and economically,
Turkmenistan remains the least changed of all the former Soviet
republics. The 1992 post-communist constitution was drafted and
passed without public consultation and effectively makes the
parliament a rubber-stamp office of the president.57 The government
views any nongovernmental organisation (NGO) with suspicion, most
evident in the fact that authorities generally deny them registration.
These are all factors that destabilise the country and contribute to a
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rise in militant activism. Until very recently, the situation regarding
freedom of belief seemed, for the foreseeable future, unchangeable.
The present situation of religious freedom in Turkmenistan must be
considered of great importance. The long-term effects on the nation,
and in particular the potential for the repression of religious
minorities to promote militant action, is of great concern. The sad
irony is that it has been under the pretext of stability that such
measures have been taken. Fifteen years after independence, the
country is still feeling the effect of over 100 years of Russian rule,
which has left it in economic and ideological crisis. The motivations
of the government in repressing religious minorities seem to be an
attempt to make the country culturally homogenous. The repressive
policies and actions of the government towards religious movements
seem to be based not so much based on intolerance or on a claim to
the exclusivity of the truth, as on fear of diversity and of losing
control. Nevertheless, they are grossly misguided.
Coda: A New Dawn?
Heraclitus wrote that ‘the only constant is change’ and, while the
political climate in Turkmenistan has been in stasis for some time,
there is now great hope for a new beginning. On 21 December 2006,
President Saparmurat Niyazov died after suffering cardiac arrest.
Human rights commissions and NGOs were quick to highlight the
good fortune in this event and to recommend that the Turkmen
government take steps to dismantle Niyazov’s self-created
personality cult and cease the human rights abuses.58 Initial
indications are that the country is set for very slow change at best,
with the six presidential candidates (all TDP members elected by the
People’s Council) pledging to follow the ideals laid out by Niyazov.59
Given that Niyazov occupied the positions of president, prime
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minister, commander of the armed forces and leader of the TDP (the
only political party allowed in the country), and given that there is no
heir apparent, some media sources speculate that infighting will be
the likely result.60
There are nevertheless some signs that change may be in the winds.
On 11 February 2007, the country elected a new president,
Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who has stated that restrictions on
internet access, making it available only to government officials and
embassies, must be lifted.61 He has likewise pledged significant social
reforms, stating, ‘I want to be president of a democratic country,
where rich people live and work, where all conditions for free life and
free work are created’.62 This apparent shift in social ideology is a
marked change from the previous regime, which prided itself of
isolation and the quashing of difference and dissent. What is in store
for the religious groups of Turkmenistan can only be guessed. What
is certain is that the new president and his government will have the
opportunity to end what has recently been one of the world’s most
oppressive and restrictive environments for the practice of religion.
We can only watch and hope.
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